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Introduction
While theories of value change have a long tradition in the social sciences (e.g., Weber 1904) , Ronald Inglehart's silent revolution thesis sparked a particularly intense scholarly debate on changing value preferences in Western societies (for an review see e.g., van Deth & Scarbrough 1995 , Hitlin & Piliavin 2004 . In a series of publications (e.g., Inglehart 1971 , Inglehart 1977 , Inglehart 1997 , Inglehart & Welzel 2005 , Inglehart formulated the thesis that the sustained improvement of socioeconomic conditions in advanced industrial societies in the second half of the twentieth century has caused a gradual shift in the population's value preferences from materialistic goals such as physical security and economic stability to postmaterialistic goals such as self-actualization and civic participation.
Inglehart puts forward an individual-level behavioral model of value preference formation that forms the theoretical underpinning of such aggregate forecasts. In the original formulation of his theory, the behavioral model holds, first, that individuals develop their value preferences during a formative period of their youth and retain them unchanged during their life course (socialization hypothesis). Second, the socioeconomic environment experienced during the preadult period determines the direction of preferences: the experience of economic insecurity disposes young adults to prefer materialistic values, while the experience of lasting affluence favors the development of postmaterialistic value preferences (scarcity hypothesis). The criticism that has been launched against the thesis of post-materialistic value change focuses largely on this behavioral model of value preferences (e.g., 1 Marsh 1975 , Flanagan 1987 , Warwick 1998 as well as Inglehart's empirical operationalization of value preferences (e.g., van Deth 1983b , Davis & Davenport 1999 ).
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One prominent objection against Inglehart's view of value formation in young adults has been the relative neglect of parental influences (social learning hypothesis). Given the abundant evidence of the transmission of values and attitudes from one generation to the next (e.g., Jennings & Niemi 1968 , Glass, Bengtson & Dunham 1986 ), a theory that highlights intergenerational differences resulting from differing preadult experiences but that ignores intergenerational similarities resulting from social learning is likely to overestimate value change due to generational replacement. The present paper attempts to advance the post-materialism debate by estimating the effect of the economic position of family background and contrasting it with the effect of parental political views on value formation in young adults.
Despite numerous attempts to either empirically prove or refute the postmaterialism thesis, the evidence produced thus far provides, in our view, only indirect support for the behavioral model's validity. To evaluate the socialization hypothesis, many of these studies have estimated the stability of value preferences in adult respondents to determine their preadult origin.
Preadult socialization may not be the only possible account for stable value preferences, however. To evaluate the scarcity hypothesis, many link crosssectional survey data on adults' value preferences either to respondents' recall 1 In his more recent publications, Inglehart addresses some of this critique by amending aspects of his original thesis. Note that the present paper is designed to test his original thesis of a 'silent revolution' and does not claim to test any later expansions of this theory.
information on the economic security of their parental household during their youth or to aggregate data on the national economy, typically in the form of cohort studies. While proxy information seem unreliable and possibly endogenous in this context, national economic indices appear unsuitable for drawing inferences on individuals' personal experiences during their political maturation.
The present study attempts to fill this gap by rigorously testing the basic behavioral assumptions behind Inglehart's original thesis and contrasting it with the social learning hypothesis using an alternative research design that studies siblings' value preferences. Research on siblings -and dyadic designs in general-are becoming increasingly important in the fields of psychology (e.g., Eaves et al. 1999 , Lake et al. 2000 , sociology (e.g., Duncan et al. 1998 , Warren, Sheridan & Hauser 2002 , and economics (e.g., Solon 1992 , Björklund et al. 2002 , but are seldom used in political science.
One advantage of a design that investigates the extent to which siblings share the same value preferences is that it can identify the sum of the influences of the preadult environment on the formation of value preferences without modeling each of these idiosyncratic experiences separately. Moreover, this paper uses longitudinal data containing direct measures of siblings' parental households starting in their childhood to overcome the problems of using either adult respondents' recall of their parental environment during youth or national indices.
This longitudinal sibling design is facilitated by household panel data, which have been underutilized in past value research. Despite their primary focus on social mobility and inequality, the German Socio-Economic Panel
Study (SOEP)
2 contains two decades of measures of post-materialism (1986, 1996, 2006) either on typical life-course trajectories in the development of value preferences or on exposed period-specific events. According to the first school of thought, individuals become more materialistic, for instance, when they take on adult responsibilities (Marsh 1975 , Klages, Hippler & Herbert 1992 . According to the second school of thought, individuals (no matter what their age) become more materialistic when they experience a difficult economic situation, either personally or on a broader scale (Dalton 1977 , Flanagan 1982 .
One strategy for testing the socialization hypothesis uses estimates of the stability of value preferences over time, and concludes their responsiveness to life-course and period-specific events from this. An alternative strategy estimates the effects of key events experienced at different stages of the lifecourse to determine individuals' value preferences. Both of these strategies for testing the socialization hypothesis have been subjected to some amount of criticism.
Empirical evidence of the stability of post-materialistic value preferences over time often turns out to be inconclusive. Some authors report low (van Deth 1983a) and others high stability estimates (De Graaf, Hagenaars & Luijkx 1989 ). These differences may be attributed partly to the differing methodologies used to disentangle the stability in the concept and measurement of post-materialism, and partly to the conflicting interpretations of the magnitude of correlations over time as reflecting 'stability'. Furthermore, estimates of stability in value preferences can be called into question from a conceptual point of view as well. As Fiorina (1981) and Achen (1992) value preferences as being unrelated to, for instance, inflation rates during their formative years (Duch & Taylor 1993 ) is vulnerable to the critique of not considering the appropriate economic indices (Inglehart & Abramson 1994 ).
Not only conceptually but also empirically, reproducing personal experiences during political maturation is an extremely complex task since most sources of data on value preferences do not cover characteristics of the individual's preadult environment.
In many cases, cohort membership is used as omnibus proxy for similar experiences during the formative years. However, it is highly unlikely that all members of a certain cohort in a certain society experience the same national events uniformly, let alone the same events at a regional, local, or family level. This problem is acknowledged by Inglehart & Abramson (1994) 
Preadult Determinants of Values
For simplicity, the previous section alludes to the environment during political maturation that determines value preferences without explicitly naming the nature of these circumstances. Inglehart's post-materialism thesis involves, however, an additional hypothesis on the set of incidents that are relevant for the formation of value preferences. The scarcity hypothesis states that experiences of physical insecurity and socioeconomic instability abet the development of materialistic values, while the opposite terms facilitate preferences for postmaterialistic values. This hypothesis builds on the idea of Maslow's (1954) need hierarchy, according to which individuals try to satisfy their basic security and material needs first and foremost, and only if these are met will they pursue social needs. Only then, on the condition that both security and material needs as well as social needs have been met, will they try to satisfy higher-order intellectual needs.
The socioeconomic environment is only one plausible determinant of emerg- Evidence of parental transmission of political orientations was reported in many of the early socialization studies (cf. Searing, Wright & Rabinowitz 1976 ). These findings were interpreted to suggest that political orientations originate at a stage of childhood before the ability to understand political issues and evaluate political events is fully developed (Easton & Dennis 1969 , Greenstein 1965 , Hess & Torney 1967 , and that children frequently share their parents' political preferences (Campbell et al. 1960 , Levin 1961 . Numerous qualifications have since been placed on the finding of strong parentchild congruencies in political orientations. For example, Jennings & Niemi (1968 , 1981 showed that previous studies overrated the degree of similarity between parents and children due to projection effects in surveys of adolescents alone (see also Westholm 1999) . However, the data they had collected from parents and children independently still revealed a substantial level of partisan congruency (see also Zuckerman, Dasovic & Fitzgerald 2007) . Moreover, Glass, Bengtson & Dunham (1986) demonstrated that parental political orientations continue to contribute significantly to young adults' affilia-8 tions even if intergenerational persistence in socioeconomic status-a prominent rival explanation-is taken into account (see also Cassel 1982 , Knoke & Hout 1974 , Tedin 1974 .
In light of the evidence that suggests that political orientations in young adults are shaped by social learning, it is important to note the one-sided focus on parental economic position of Inglehart's original thesis on postmaterialistic value formation in young adults. Furthermore, his theory stresses differences in value preferences between generations rather than similarities.
Allowing for the intergenerational transmission of value preferences not only has consequences for the validity of the thesis but also for its aggregate predictions: the higher the intergenerational transmission of values, the smaller the immediate effects of exogenous shocks on the current population's political orientations but the larger the durable effects on later cohorts.
Critique has been directed not only at the strategy of testing the scarcity hypothesis using national socioeconomic indices pertaining to the formative years of adult respondents, but also at the strategy of using recall information on parental characteristics at a time when the respondents were in their formative years. The problem of recall data in this context is that the concepts measured are either very general and stable in nature but easy to recall, or that they are proper measures of the formative security at a specific point in time but difficult to recall. Abramson & Inglehart (1996) , for instance, choose the first option and operationalize formative security as a function of parental education and occupation. On the one hand, however, education has a unique conceptual status with respect to value preference formation; on the other hand, occupational prestige is a different concept than financial worries and economic scarcity. Using recall questions to measure indicators of precarious economic situations such as parents' receipt of social benefits or job worries is likely to produce unreliable answers due to projection and memory effects, and possibly also answers endogenous with respondents' current economic position.
The research of this paper aims to avoid these problems by drawing on longitudinal household data. The paper uses direct and very detailed measures of the household's economic situation when the siblings were in their formative years, and it estimates the effect of these indicators of economic security on value preferences of siblings as adults. The SOEP data also include measures of parents' post-materialist values before the siblings reached adulthood. We are thus able to compare the estimated effects of parents' economic scarcity on their children's later value preferences with the estimated effects of parental value preferences, i.e. social learning.
Analysis
Post-materialstic value preferences are surveyed in the SOEP at ten-year intervals: so far, in the years 1986, 1996, and 2006. We consider only information on those sets of siblings interviewed successfully at least twice at a ten-year interval. Moreover, we draw on a social rather than biological definition of siblings (and also parenthood), whereby if at least two individuals name the same person(s) as their parent(s), we consider these individuals siblings. Before turning to empirical tests of the socialization hypothesis, the scarcity hypothesis, and the social learning hypothesis we discuss measures of post-materialism in the following.
Although the so-called Inglehart-items have been an established part of surveys for more than thirty years, scholars continue to disagree on their suitability as an instrument and how they can be implemented into an adequate measurement model. The SOEP uses the standard short version of the post-materialism instrument proposed by Inglehart (1971) Inglehart's post-materialism instrument has been the subject of much debate on both a conceptual and a methodological level. Some authors object to the choice of items. Duch & Taylor (1993) and Warwick (1998) , for instance, argue that the two items 'giving people more say in important government decisions' and 'protecting freedom of speech' do not tap democratic values but rather postmaterialism. Clarke & Dutt (1991) , for instance, criticizes that the sensitivity of the item 'fighting rising prices' to actual inflation and unemployment rates predisposes it to failure as a measure of time-invariant value preferences. Other researchers have questioned the choice of a ranking instead of a rating format (e.g., van Deth 1983b ). Yet others doubt that a unidimensional latent variable called 'post-materialism' elicits the observed ranking answers (e.g., Sacchi 1998), and some authors even deny the internal consistency of the above measure (Davis & Davenport 1999) . Although not designed to test the validity of the instrument, the analysis presented below argues that the fundamental criticisms voiced by Davis & Davenport (1999) are unwarranted. In the first step, individual i selects the policy goal p that elicits the highest unobserved utility, u ip from among four alternatives {A,B,C,D}. In the second step, a (first) choice is made again from the remaining three alternatives, and in the final step, respondents choose the policy goals from the last two alternatives that, again, elicits the highest utility (Luce 1959) . That is, for all p = q,
Response Model of Post-Materialism
The unobserved utility u ip is assumed to consist of a linear predictor of observed utility v ip , a common factor underlying the responses that represents individual i's unobserved level of post-materialism η i , and unique factors ip . Each policy goal is associated to the individual-specific level of postmaterialism η i with a specific loading λ p .
We further assume that the unobserved post-materialism η i is normally distributed in our sample, and we restrict the factor loadings λ A = 0 and λ D = 1 for identification reasons. If the error term ip has an extreme value distribution, then the differences u ip − u iq have a logistic distribution (McFadden 1974) and it follows in the case of a complete ranking
) that the probability of observing the ranking data has the following form (Luce & Suppes 1965) : unique rank patterns which are each associated with a certain factor score of post-materialism. Figure 1 reports these values of η it , which have been transformed to a 0 to 1 scale for ease of interpretation. Entries in Figure 1 4 The popularity of items seems to decline as a function of their order of presentation, which may be interpreted as indicative of an order-more specifically-a primacy effect (cf. Only repeated observations of siblings over a considerable time span allow us to disentangle transitory fluctuations from time-invariant components of value preferences. The only case in which cross-sectional data on siblings would produce an unbiased estimate of similarity would be the unlikely case in which value preferences are perfectly stable throughout the life course.
In more formal terms, controlling for temporal fluctuations means decomposing the latent post-materialism value of individual i from sibling set j at time point t, η ijt , into a time-invariant sibling-set-specific factor, ϕ j , a timeinvariant individual-specific factor, ϑ ij , and a factor of temporal fluctuations ε ijt 5 (Solon 1992 , Solon et al. 1991 .
Hence, the population variance of latent post-materialism, σ 
Similarity in siblings' permanent value preferences, ρ, thus demonstrates the importance of the stationary sibling factor relative to the stationary individual factor. In hierarchical regression modeling, ρ is often referred to as the intraclass correlation.
5 Plus the variance of the measurement error in the response model ijtp , which for simplicity reasons is not mentioned in the main text but is considered in all empirical analyses reported in this paper.
The first hierarchical regression model of Table 2 = 0.428 for the third age group. While socialization indeed appears crucial for value preference formation, its importance seems to disappear over time. Model 4 reported in Table 3 6 However, as argued before, it is impossible to capture all the experiences of young adults that affect the formation of their value preferences. We therefore do not expect to explain all of the variance in sibling similarities attributable to the joint effects of economic scarcity and parental education with our limited number of indicators, and consider any residual heterogeneity to come from unobserved experiences. 7 The estimates are very similar to the ones reported for the sample of siblings reported in Table 1 and therefore not displayed in a table. 20 them. Second, we give preference to parents' reports when their children were age 15. If we do not observe post-materialism of the father and mother when the children were age 15, we replace it where possible with consecutive measures of parental post-materialism at adjacent ages. Finally, if we have estimates of both paternal and maternal post-materialism, we consider the mean of both measures. As indicators of economic scarcity, we chose household poverty, parental unemployment, parental dependency on social benefits, and parental financial concerns. 8 These parental indicators, again measured when individuals are age 15, in our view, speak most directly to the aspect of formative economic (in)security.
The Lasting Effects of Parental Characteristics
Alternatively, a number of previous research studies have used parental background variables like occupational prestige and educational level as measures of formative security. Despite our reservations against these measures as proxies for formative security, we replicated the analysis of Table 3 with the alternative economic indicators income, education, and job prestige in Model 5. We do find, however, that the more prestigious a parental occupation, the more likely it is that children will become postmaterialists.
In our view, it is not clear from the literature what may explain this effect.
As argued before, we do not consider job prestige, particularly after controlling for income, as an appropriate indicator for (the absence of) economic scarcity.
Note that these results also emerge if we control for indicators of economic scarcity and social status of the offspring as adults (not reported in form of a table). That is, the intergenerational transmission of post-materialism is more than a mere reflection of the transmission of social position but is likely to be the result of social learning.
scale by Wegener (1992) .
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The main aim of this study has been, first, to empirically test the behav- There is a another, more technical reason why the true ρ may be underestimated: our sample contains different numbers of siblings I j per family and different numbers of observations T ji on persons, both of which may lead to serial correlation in the residual term. As our data contain a maximum of three observations on respondents, we are unable to control for such serial correlations by introducing a lagged term of postmaterialism into the analysis.
Both problems-parents treating children differently and serial correlationsthus suggest that our reported similarity in permanent value preferences is at best underestimated, and our test of the socialization hypothesis may therefore be regarded as conservative.
The interpretation of sibling similarity as the expression of shared experiences and of similarity between parents and children as the product of social learning represent the dominating paradigms in the literature on value formation and political orientations in young adults. However, there are also two alternative interpretations of sibling similarity and parent-offspring similarity apart from shared experiences and parental education. First, Zuckerman The underlying logic of twin studies is that the different rates of genetic similarity in monozygotic twins as opposed to dizygotic twins represents the only difference between the two groups. Assuming that the rate of shared social environment during their formative years is identical for both types of twins, it follows that the extent to which monozygotic twins display higher levels of similarity than dizygotic twins serves as a measure of the weight of heritability relative to the shared environment.
less, one would be surprised to find a somewhat higher ρ-value for dizygotic than for monozygotic twins, suggesting that parental education is primarily responsible for sibling similarity in value preferences, and not heritability.
Again, the reliability of the comparison between monozygotic and dizygotic twins is clearly restricted by the extremely small number of observations.
Another analysis that was reported in a table but tentatively corroborates the parental education hypothesis compares siblings according to their age differences. The heritability argument implies a constant similarity in sibling values irrespective of age differences, while the hypotheses of a shared preadult environment and mutual reinforcement suggest a decreasing similarity in sibling values with increasing differences in age. In the empirical data we find the second pattern of findings. Similarly, results presented in Table 2 suggest an attenuation of sibling similarity by age, which again is in line with the hypotheses of a shared environment and mutual reinforcement. Due to the small number of observations on twins and the indirect means of testing heritability by comparing siblings with different age gaps, any conclusions on the (absence of) heritability in post-materialism are highly speculative and are presented here only as a suggestion for future research, not as a tested hypothesis.
These uncertainties in the interpretation of sibling similarity in postmaterialism notwithstanding, the present study unequivocally establishes that the individual formation of value preferences largely dates from preadult background and is thus not a completely deliberate consideration of the current political events and information. Consequently, value change may to a certain extent only be a lagged function of social change. The phenomenon 27 of intergenerational transmission examined here also suggests a decelerated value change by generational replacement, since each generation tends to adopt more reject the value preferences of its predecessors. Table 1 . Note. *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.10. Data Source. SOEP 1986 SOEP , 1996 SOEP , and 2006 Note. *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.10. Data Source. SOEP 1986 SOEP , 1996 SOEP , and 2006 
